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Abstract
No real epistemological disagreement exists that legal knowledge can be represented and 
understood in categorical form.  At issue is the extent to which categorical analysis captures the 
full complexity of legal reasoning.  Can legal reasoning be represented as a taxonomy of 
mutually-exclusive classes, a taxonomy considered necessary if legal certainty and the rule of 
law are to prevail, or does the complexity of the process defy attempts at exhaustive 
classification?
The author agrees with those who argue that multiple legal concepts must often be applied 
simultaneously to resolve legal problems.  The author also acknowledges that simultaneous 
application of multiple concepts appears to exclude the possibility of representing legal 
knowledge as mutually-exclusive classes.  The objective of this analysis is to reconcile the 
ostensible incompatibility between these two propositions  by arguing that concurrency of legal 
concepts does not preclude determinacy in categorical analysis.  
Notwithstanding conventional wisdom to the contrary, the reality of legal reasoning, which 
involves the application of overlapping concepts, can indeed be reconciled with the fact that the 
utility of legal classification as a way of representing legal knowledge depends upon the 
determinacy of legal classes.  Briefly stated, reconciling concurrency and determinacy is simply 
a matter of perspective.  
If we are to take seriously the epistemology of legal classification, that is to say, the question of 
whether classification can provide an account of the origins and nature of legal knowledge, we 
need to look not just at the product of legal classification but at the process itself. The fixed 
boundaries of spatial classification do not provide scope for concurrency and determinacy to 
exist simultaneously within a single class.  We can, however, take account of both concurrency 
and determinacy within a single class by adopting a temporal rather than spatial perspective.  
From this perspective, we are able to expand our focus from legal classes as products to legal 
classification as a process.  Such a perspective allows us to focus on the dynamic relationship of 
relativity between legal concepts as they operate in context, rather than the static relationship of 
demarcation that exists when legal classes are examined in the abstract.
1 INTRODUCTION
Legal classification as a way of knowing law is a difficult concept to communicate to others 
using its own abstract terms.  For this reason, some jurists make use of metaphors to explain the 
relationship between legal classification and the nature and origins of legal knowledge.   For 
example, common law jurists who see a direct relationship between legal classification and legal 
reasoning often rely on a mapping metaphor.1  Advocates of recent “mapping projects” in the 
common law argue that legal concepts can be classified in a manner that provides a complete 
representation (as opposed to rendering) of the common law, just as a topographical map is a 
representation of the terrain upon which it is based.  
When legal concepts are classified with sufficient definitional rigour, legal reasoning in both 
common and civil law legal traditions is a matter of locating the helpful ‘you are here’ signpost 
in the midst of a given legal problem.   The methodology of each legal tradition differs in that 
one looks to codal provisions while another looks to a body of precedent to locate the relevant 
legal principles.  The methodology of each tradition is the same to the extent that classification 
of a legal problem precedes resolution.  Factual circumstances are matched to a content-based 
class and resolution of the legal issue proceeds by applying the contents of the class to the 
problem.  Most importantly, and with reference to the metaphor of mapping, just as a border 
demarcates mutually-exclusive locations (even though the border itself may change), legal 
concepts must be constructed as mutually-exclusive classes if the rule of law is to prevail.  
1 Cartography is a popular choice of metaphor, perhaps due to the jurisdictional orientation of most systems of 
legal education.
2Concurrency of legal concepts in two or more classes would lead to indeterminacy of legal 
classes and inconsistency in legal reasoning.  
Jurists who object to mapping metaphors claim that a two-dimensional spatial 
representation such as a map cannot accurately reflect the process of legal reasoning.  Legal 
reasoning often requires the simultaneous application of multiple concepts that defy 
classification. ‘You are here’ on a two-dimensional plane such as a map is limited to a single 
location.  In contrast, the complexity of legal reasoning requires jurists to locate themselves, 
metaphorically, in two or more places at once.  A mapping metaphor cannot account for the 
manner in which multiple legal concepts must be applied simultaneously to resolve legal 
problems.
No real epistemological disagreement can exist that legal knowledge can be represented 
and understood in categorical form.  As Smith states, and most jurists (not to mention cognitive 
scientists) would agree, legal classification is part of the process of acquiring and developing 
legal knowledge. 2  Although the classification criteria are always open to challenge, legal 
knowledge is predicated upon content-based classes.  The question is whether the complexity of 
legal reasoning is best understood as the application of mutually- exclusive classes or a 
combination of a relatively stable body of classes along with a number of overlapping concepts 
that defy classification.  Accordingly, disagreement as to the appropriateness of a mapping
metaphor is actually disagreement concerning the nature of the relationship between legal 
2 S. Smith “A Map of the Common Law?” (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L. J. 364 at 365.
3classification and legal reasoning.  Those who reject the mapping metaphor are in effect rejecting 
the argument that law can be represented fully in the form of mutually-exclusive legal classes.
The author accepts the argument that multiple legal concepts must often be applied 
simultaneously to resolve legal problems, and that the prospect of overlapping concepts appears 
to exclude the possibility of representing legal knowledge in the form of mutually-exclusive 
classes.  The author also accepts the argument that legal concepts must be constructed as 
mutually-exclusive classes if the rule of law is to prevail.  Thus the modest objective of this 
analysis is to reconcile the ostensible incompatibility between the reality of legal reasoning, 
which involves the application of overlapping concepts, and the fact that the utility of legal 
classification as a way of representing legal knowledge depends upon the determinacy of legal 
classes.  
Briefly stated, no conflict between these propositions exists; concurrency of legal 
concepts does not preclude determinacy in legal classification, as the issue is one of perspective.   
The solution is to perceive of legal classes from a temporal rather than spatial perspective.  The 
advantage of adding a fourth, temporal dimension to the analysis is that the primary focus is no 
longer on classes as products but classification as a process. We cannot take account of the 
concurrency of legal concepts within a single class by viewing legal classes in spatial form.  
The fixed boundaries of spatial classification do not provide scope for concurrency and 
determinacy to co-exist within a single class.  We can, however, identify and analyze 
concurrency of legal concepts within a single class by adopting a temporal perspective, with the 
emphasis on relativity rather than demarcation between legal concepts.  
4This analysis begins in Part II with a brief summary of the basic arguments for and 
against classification schemes as a way of knowing law.  Part III demonstrates the limitations of 
a purely spatial approach to legal classification with a suitable example drawn from a current 
taxonomic debate, that of the ‘propertization’ of intellectual property.  The neologism of 
‘propertization’ is a response to the current expansionary trend in intellectual property 
protection, particularly patent protection for biotechnological innovations.  A claim of 
‘propertization’ is based on the assumption that intellectual property and property per se 3
represent mutually-exclusive legal classes; expanding the scope of  intellectual property 
protection results in the unjustified ‘propertization’ of intellectual property as a legal class.  Part 
IV demonstrates the utility of legal classification as a way of knowing law, even in 
circumstances of overlapping concepts, by applying a temporal analysis to resolve the 
presumptive debate concerning the definitional integrity of the legal classes of intellectual 
property and property per se.  Part V then reframes the propertization debate with a discussion of 
two deficiencies of legal reasoning identified by applying a temporal analysis of legal 
classification to problems in intellectual property law.  The first is the manner in which exclusive 
reliance on spatial analysis in the face of concurrency of legal concepts produces 
unacknowledged sites of normativity that affect legal reasoning in unexpected ways.  The second 
is the extent to which a spatial perspective of intellectual property precludes recognition of the 
proprietary attributes of this legal class and concomitant ethical concerns other than those 
3 Property per se refers to all forms of privately held property in both civil and common law legal traditions.  
Note that in many civil law systems, intellectual property is classified as a form of property and include the 
relevant provisions within the section of the Code dealing with patrimonial rights.  This classification does not 
resolve the propertization debate; the terms of the debate simply shift away from an intellectual 
property/property per se distinction to a distinction between two different kinds of property and the appropriate 
characteristics of each.  The necessity of strict boundaries of demarcation remains.  
5traditionally associated with the balance in intellectual property law between public access and 
private gain.
2 LEGAL CLASSIFICATION AND METAPHORS FOR LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
Birks has perhaps devoted the most attention to developing a classification scheme for the 
common law, most notably the law of obligations.4 Birks is also a strong advocate of the two -
dimensional spatial metaphor of mapping.  He uses this metaphor not only to describe the 
knowledge structure of the common law but also to present a normative claim for greater 
precision in common law taxonomy.  For Birks, a legal problem, like a physical person, can only 
be in one place at a time.  Content-based legal classes are mutually-exclusive and classification 
must proceed accordingly if law is to function properly.  A rationalized legal taxonomy provides 
the necessary definitional rigour without which consistency in law, and therefore the rule of law, 
could not exist.  Thus the definitions used to construct legal classes might be arbitrary to a 
certain extent, but this deficiency is offset by the resulting gains in stability and consistency. 5
One hopes, however, that through the use of rigorous taxonomic debate arbitrary distinctions can 
be minimized.6
4 See, for example, P. Birks, English Private Law (Oxford 2000).
5 Birks, “Definition and Division:  A Mediation on Institutes 3.13” in P. Birks (ed.), The Classification of 
Obligations (Oxford 1997) 1 at 6.
6 For Birks, the common law legal tradition has difficulty developing a suitable classification system because 
common law lawyers have abandoned the taxonomic debate so central to civilian legal traditions.  The common 
law is amenable to the Gaian taxonomy of persons, things and actions, but common law lawyers reject the logic 
of this classification system.   They are content instead to rely instead on the organizing principle of the 
alphabet.  Birks also identifies a second problem proceeding from the common law’s lack of concern with 
taxonomy.  To demonstrate his point, Birks temporarily mixes the metaphors of cartography and compatible 
software (or what we would now call “open systems”).  The common law lacks an organizing principle capable 
of supporting a meaningful system of classification.  Thus legal knowledge in the common law exists as a series 
6In contrast to Birks, Waddams is sceptical of the metaphor of mapping as applied to 
understand the relationship between legal classes and legal reasoning.  His resistance is based 
primarily on the complexity of legal reasoning.  Legal knowledge cannot be mapped because 
legal reasoning does not proceed with reference to mutually-exclusive legal classes.  Legal 
concepts do not necessarily exist independently of each other, and cases are often decided on the 
basis of a number of legal concepts operating concurrently. 7  The difficulty with mapping 
metaphors is that while concurrency is inherent in the process of legal reasoning, mutually-
exclusive legal classes derived from mapping projects do not allow for jurists to locate 
themselves in two or more places at the same time.  Given that a legal issue cannot be assigned 
to any one concept (class) alone, the metaphor of mapping is ill-advised.8
Thus Waddams argues against the utility of Birks’ mapping project on the basis that two-
dimensional representations of legal knowledge cannot account for the dynamic and reiterative 
nature of legal reasoning.  Geopolitical territories are often in flux, and physical landscapes do 
change over time.  Cartographers, however, may be reasonably certain that they are accurately 
of isolated legal doctrines.  Jurists are capable of working at a sophisticated level within these isolated classes, 
but to adopt the metaphor of incompatible software, they cannot transfer the data of a legal problem to a 
different legal class.  The classes do not make use of compatible software, and thus lawyers cannot devise 
solutions to legal problems based on common law doctrines which exist outside of their particular specialty.  As 
Birks writes, “If lawyers cannot move efficiently across the law, the law itself cannot be reliably applied.  
Individuals must then lose cases they should have won or, more commonly, settle or abandon claims on wrong 
advice”. (Ibid. at 34)  In other words, good lawyers need good maps and compatible software, and taxonomic 
debate within the common law tradition is a worthwhile exercise in cartography and systems design.  Lawyers 
should seek to introduce greater order into the common law legal tradition by constructing well-defined two-
dimensional legal classes which, like jurisdictions on a territorial map, are joined by contiguous boundaries 
which do not intersect.
7 Stephen Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law:  Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning
(Cambridge 2002) at 13.
8 Ibid. at 226.
7mapping a particular terrain at any given time.9 More significantly, they can be absolutely 
certain that the action of mapping alone does not change the underlying physical terrain.10  The 
same cannot be said of the relationship between jurists and law.  As Waddams notes, unlike the 
field of cartography, in law one often has difficulty distinguishing the map from the terrain.11
Sometimes legal classification represents existing legal knowledge, at other times classification 
is used to create new legal knowledge.  As Levi succinctly stated, “the classification changes as 
the classification is made”.12
Arguing from a common law legal tradition, Waddams objects not only to the metaphor 
of mapping but also to similar legal classification schemas in general, at least to the extent that 
the system of classification requires that each legal issue be resolved with reference to a single 
conceptual locations.13 Such exclusivity, according to Waddams, is incompatible with the nature 
of common law reasoning.   Smith concurs with this assessment, noting that if a common law 
map was indeed faithful to the complex common law terrain, the map would contain thousands, 
perhaps even millions, of sui generis  categories.14  This would defeat the purpose of legal 
classification which is to represent, rather than render, law as a system of knowledge.  Similarly, 
cross-referencing between classes would not address the problem.  As Waddams argues, the 
9 But see:  Mark Monmonier, How to lie with maps (The University of Chicago Press 1991).
10 This presumes, of course, that constructivist perspectives are for the moment irrelevant.
11 See Waddams, above n 7 at 226.
12 Ibid. at 15.
13 Ibid. at 232.
14 See Smith, above n 2 at 375.
8bibliographic form of classification is inapplicable to law.15  A catalogue entry for a book can 
have cross-references to multiple classes (subject headings) because a book is not a class but an 
instance of a class.  If we were to characterize each legal instance not already represented by a 
class as a class in its own right, this would be equivalent to replacing the subject headings in the 
Library of Congress catalogue with the actual titles of each catalogued entry.  Such a knowledge 
structure lacks an organizing theme and thus provides no insights into the origins and nature of 
legal knowledge.    
To conclude, however, that legal reasoning cannot be mapped onto a two-dimensional 
plane does not preclude the possibility that legal knowledge can be represented in categorical 
form.  Samuels, for example, suggests that a three-dimensional model could be used to represent 
the complex process of legal reasoning described by Waddams.  To demonstrate such a model, 
Samuels provides as a useful example a set of litigation facts that could concurrently pose 
problems in public and private law, and exist simultaneously as a problem in both contract law 
and property law.  Although Samuels acknowledges that Waddams is likely to reject even a 
three-dimensional schematic model, the model nonetheless demonstrates the possibility of 
representing the concurrent application of legal concepts without sacrificing the utility of 
classification as a way of knowing law.16
Both Birks' common law mapping project and Samuel’s proposed three-dimensional 
model demonstrate that legal classification as an epistemological account of law is a matter of 
15 See Waddams, above, n 7 at 230.
16 G. Samuel, “Can the Common Law Be Mapped?” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 271 at 292, 293.
9perspective.  Both two-dimensional and three-dimensional models address the legal 
epistemology of classification by focusing on a particular legal class, or combination of classes, 
in spatial terms.  At the simplest level, we can have a one-to-one relationship between a set of 
factual circumstances, which is an instance of a class, and the class itself, which contains a single 
legal concept.  We can account for this relationship with a two-dimensional view of 
classification whereby the relevant legal class is represented as a flat square.   The rule of law 
prevails by applying this same class to all relevant sets of factual circumstances, based on the 
decision rule for inclusion within the class.
At the next level of complexity we have a one-to-many relationship between a set of 
factual circumstances as an instance of two or more classes, each representing a single legal 
concept.  We can account for this relationship with a three-dimensional view of classification 
whereby the flat square becomes a cube representing the interaction of up to six legal classes.
The rule of law prevails by applying each of these classes concurrently to all relevant sets of 
factual circumstances, based on the decision rule for inclusion within the class.
Classification becomes a challenge only when we must accomplish that which Waddams 
asserts is not possible, and that is to locate the reiterative and interdependent relationship 
between multiple legal concepts within a single class in a manner that retains the definitional 
integrity of the class.  Note that the problem here is not the simultaneous application of multiple 
classes, such as the classes of contract and tort to a set of factual circumstances, as this is simply 
the concurrent application of two discrete classes and can be accommodated in a three-
dimensional spatial representation such as Samuels’ cube described above.  Nor can the 
conceptual difficulty be resolved by having one class for the legal concept of contract, one for 
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the concept of tort, and one for the concept of contract/tort.  Hybridism would merely return us 
to the unwieldy map of sui generis classes referred to by Smith. 
The challenge is to conceive of a manner in which a single class applied in the process of 
legal reasoning can represent a dynamic relationship between concepts, such as the concepts of 
contract (consent) and tort (wrongs),17 and yet still retain an organizational structure capable of 
providing meaning in law.  Content-based classification requires decision rules for placing legal 
concepts within a particular class, and these decision rules cannot be arbitrary if the rule of law is 
to include both certainty and fairness.  The rules must be justified, and it is the justificatory 
rationales behind the decision rules that account for the mutually-exclusive nature of legal 
classes.  A justificatory rationale justifies nothing if the end result is that a legal concept can be 
what it is and what it is not at the same time, for this amount to a justification of mutually-
exclusive outcomes.
Is it possible then to represent concurrency of legal concepts, which for the sake of 
argument are predicated upon different justificatory rationales, within a single, non-hybrid legal 
class?  This is what we must do if classification is to represent and not simply render the 
complexity of law as a system of knowledge.  As stated earlier, the issue is one of perspective.  
The solution is to perceive of legal classes from a temporal rather than spatial perspective.  The 
advantage of adding a fourth, temporal dimension to the analysis is that the primary focus is no 
longer on classes as products but classification as a process.  
17 See Smith, above n  2 at  382.
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Consider Waddams’ statement that “[t]he contents of legal categories…cannot be 
itemized, sorted or enumerated”.18  Consider also his description of legal concepts as working 
concurrently, cumulatively and most significantly, in a complementary fashion, in that each 
concept supplements the meaning of other concepts.  We cannot take account of the concurrency 
of legal concepts within a single class by viewing legal classes in a spatial form, whether two-
dimensional or three-dimensional.  The fixed boundaries of spatial classification limit the 
possibilities of concurrency to impermissible overlap in two-dimensional space and simultaneous 
application of discrete classes when viewed in three-dimensional form.
We can, however, identify and analyze concurrency of legal concepts within a single 
class by adopting a temporal perspective where the emphasis is on relativity rather than 
demarcation between legal concepts.  If we are to take seriously the epistemology of legal 
classification, that is to say, the question of whether classification can provide an account of the 
origins and nature of legal knowledge, we need to look not just at the product of legal 
classification but at the process itself.  If one agrees with Waddams (and Levi) that legal 
classifications are dynamic and thus always in flux, then at no point in time is the content of a 
legal class necessarily fixed.  A spatial analysis is merely an arbitrary, albeit necessary, stopping 
point by which we can distinguish legal classes as products from legal classification as a process.
A temporal perspective brings a much-needed focus on the process of legal classification 
as a more complete way of knowing law in categorical form.  The emphasis is on the experience 
of contact and exchange between content-based legal classes as they operate concurrently in a 
18 See Waddams, above n 7 at 225.
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given context.19  For legal classifications predicated upon modalities of resource allocation, as 
will be discussed in the next section, perhaps the most significant context is that of the political 
economy of the market.  Legal meaning from a temporal rather than spatial perspective does not 
simply result from the taxonomy of the classification system predicated upon justificatory 
rationales, but is derived as well from what we learn from the mediation between the form and 
function of legal classes during market transactions.  Under these conditions, concurrency of 
legal concepts is not an obstacle to classification but instead is one method by which 
classification as a way of knowing law takes place.  
3 ‘PROPERTIZATION’ AND THE LIMITS OF SPATIAL ANALYSIS
The limits of spatial analysis as a way of knowing law can be illustrated by examining the 
nature of the legal classes of intellectual property and property per se.  Intellectual property as a 
legal class is typically characterized as a statutory grant of a negative right.20  This 
characterization is derived from the prevailing rationale of utilitarianism, which justifies 
intellectual property rights as time-limited statutory monopolies necessary to address the public 
goods nature of intangible assets.21  For example, a patent provides the holder with the right to 
19 The focus on encounter and exchange is adapted from the work of anthropologist François Laplantine and 
literary theorist Alexis Nouss in developing an epistemology of métissage.  Stated simply (very simply), 
métissage is a way of knowing which rejects exclusive reliance on categorical thinking, by which is meant the 
manner in which meaning is ascribed in accordance with a system of either/or binary classification. See 
François Laplantine and Alexis Nouss, Le Métissage (Flammarion 1997).
20 For example, in Canada see e.g. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at 
para. 64, Binnie J. (“While s. 44 (now s. 42) of the Patent Act gives the owner, as against the rest of the world, 
"the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others 
to be used ..." and in that respect is framed as a positive right, its effect is essentially to prevent others from 
practising an invention that, but for the patent monopoly, they would be permitted to practise.”).  
21 See P. Menell, “Intellectual Property:  General Theories” in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia 
of Law and Economics, at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/index.html (last accessed January 4, 2006).
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exclude others from making, using or selling the patented object.  A patent does not grant any 
rights in the subject matter of the patent itself.22  This negative right to exclude is narrower in 
scope than the rights granted by property per se.  
As for property per se, in civil law legal traditions the associated rights are generally 
characterized in accordance with civil law’s Romanist origins as the right to use and obtain the 
benefits of use, the right to the fruits of the property (generally in the form of income, rent or 
interest) and the right to dispose of the property in either a material or juridical sense (by 
destroying the property or by transferring ownership).23  The taxonomy is somewhat less precise 
in common law legal traditions, but an accepted characterization of the incidents of ownership 
includes: the right to possess, use and manage; to right to control the income and capital; the 
right to security; rights or incidents of transfer; the absence of a limited term; prohibition against 
harmful use; liability for execution to satisfy one’s creditors; and the incident of residuarity.24
The appropriate classification of intellectual property and property per se has not 
attracted the degree of ontological controversy one sees with other definitional disputes, such as 
the common law debate concerning the appropriate boundary (or lack thereof) between the 
concepts of tort and contract.25  This is subject to change, however, as a potentially destabilizing 
neologism, ‘propertization’, has entered the lexicon of intellectual property analysis.  The term 
22 See e.g. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (“Every patent shall contain a…grant to the patentee…of the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention…”).
23 See, for example, John E.C. Brierly & Roderick A. Macdonald, Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to Quebec 
Private Law (Emond Montgomery 1993) at 272. 
24 A.M. Honore, “Ownership” in A.G. Guest, (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford 1961) 107 at 112-24. 
25 See, for example, Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State University Press 1974).
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originates in the current expansionary trend of intellectual property protection, particularly in 
relation to patents granted for biotechnological innovations.  
Those who argue against the expansionist trend in patent protection at both the domestic 
and international level claim that courts and legislators have ‘propertized’ patents by expanding 
the nature and scope of patent protection beyond the limits set in place by one or more 
justificatory rationales, of which utilitarianism predominates.  Patents as a legal class appears to 
be approaching functional equivalency with the rights of exclusion and control granted in the 
form of property rights per se.  Propertization is seen by many as blurring the distinction 
between, and thus the meaning conveyed by, the legal classifications of intellectual property and 
property per se.  On the other hand, those who argue in support of the expansionist trend insist 
that the increased scope of patent rights, particularly in terms of subject matter, are necessary to 
deal with the unique features of innovation in the field of biotechnology.26  They reject any claim 
that increased protection is inconsistent with the accepted legal classification of a patent as a 
mere negative right to exclude.
The debate puts one in mind of a strategy familiar to some of us from childhood when 
involved in intractable disagreements with other children.  When faced with a taunt from one’s 
opponent, typically in the form of an unflattering characterization, the appropriate response was
to reply in return, ‘I know you are, but what am I?’  Adopting such a strategy, of course, meant
that the argument was never resolved.  Disagreement remained focused on the issue of 
classification, particularly classification in the abstract.  The behaviour which led to the initial 
26 The most significant problem is that the patented invention is capable of self-replication.   
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taunt remained unaddressed as each child sought, with equal frustration, to force an undesirable 
label on the other party.  The circularity of the disagreement meant that each child tried in vain to 
have, as we said then and still do now, the ‘last word’. 
The debate concerning propertization is no more complex than the interaction described 
in the above scenario.  The parties draw descriptive lines in the sand as they characterize patent 
rights in biotechnological innovation as falling on one side or the other of an is/is not spatial
classification that define s and place property and mere negative rights to exclude in mutually-
exclusive legal classes. The question posed is what intellectual property is, and not what 
intellectual property does.  This frames the propertization debate in terms that necessarily focus
attention on intellectual property and property per se in spatial form as products of legal 
classification based on one or more accepted justificatory rationales.  Little or no attention is 
given to the processes through which legal meaning is also derived from the manner in which 
methods of exclusion as legal concepts function concurrently in market transactions involving 
biotechnological innovation.
This distinction between the form and function of protection is subtle but significant.  A 
functional analysis would identify market functions typically associated with the class of 
property per se and assess whether associating these functions with the class of intellectual 
property removes the distinction between, and thus the meaning derived from, their classification 
within the taxonomy of law.  This is a different issue entirely than the question of whether such 
functions are consistent with the accepted definitional distinction between the forms of 
intellectual property and property per se as content-based classes based on their justificatory 
rationales.  In the final result, the answer to both questions may be the same, but the analytical 
distinction exists and must be examined before any such conclusions can be drawn. 
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The difficulty with the current frame of reference of the propertization debate is that it
characterizes intellectual property as a notionally pure legal class in order to give meaning to 
intellectual property as a legal concept.  Notional purity does not imply that a content-based legal 
class cannot change, but it does imply that the process of change involves a method of 
classification whereby a single legal concept is assigned to a single legal class in spatial terms.   
Hence notional purity, and thus legal meaning, is predicated on the assumption that the process 
of classification involves reference to a single site of normativity, that of one or more accepted 
justificatory rationales.  
If the classification of intellectual property proceeds in accordance with limitations set in 
place by one or more accepted justificatory rationales, then legitimate expansion of patent 
protection requires that the scope of protection remain consistent with the expression of 
intellectual property as a single legal concept assigned to a particular legal class, whether in two-
or three-dimensional spatial form.  If any inconsistency exists between the characteristics of 
intellectual property as determined by its classification and the application of intellectual 
property protection to new forms of biotechnological innovation, then presumably the legal 
concept of intellectual property no longer exists in a notionally pure legal class.  Intellectual 
property resides instead in what may be thought of as an impure class, polluted by legal concepts 
of exclusion associated with property per se rather than intellectual property.  In these 
circumstances, classification as way of knowing law becomes meaningless.  Intellectual property 
as a class cannot at one and the same time contain concepts of both intellectual property and 
property per se if the taxonomy which distinguishes intellectual property from property per se is 
to provide any understanding of the nature and origins of different rights of exclusion in these 
two areas of legal knowledge.
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One practical difficulty with this line of reasoning, quite apart from questions of 
methodology in taxonomy, is that inconsistency is difficult to identify.  In relation to the 
legitimacy of intellectual property protection for biotechnological innovation such as patents for 
DNA sequences, genes and cells comprising these genes, the competing claims concerning 
propertization represent an irreconcilable descriptive disagreement as to whether the definitional
boundaries defining the legal class of intellectual property remain intact.  As with the children 
who shout back and forth, ‘I know you are, but what am I?’ we can expect that any debate 
framed in these terms can continue indefinitely, given the difficulty of locating definitive 
empirical support for either position.  
The more significant epistemological difficulty with this line of reasoning is that the 
focus on the definitional integrity of content-based classes as opposed to the classification 
process itself means that the terms of the debate are limited to a line-drawing exercise between 
intellectual property and property per se.  Strict demarcation, however, is an illusion based on a 
limited, spatial understanding of the legal concept of intellectual property as a content-based 
legal class in which the content is derived solely from one or more accepted justificatory 
rationales used to provide the definitional certainty required by the rule of law.  Arguably, 
however, the process of classification involves not only reference to accepted (albeit contested) 
justificatory rationales, but also the operation of the legal class of intellectual property in the 
context of the political economy of the market.  Indeed, the same could be said of other legal 
classes in other contexts.  What must be kept in mind is that acknowledgment of an additional 
site of normativity provides for rather than precludes definitional clarity. 
The significance of the specific context of the political economy of the market in relation 
to the legal classification of intellectual property is that the foundational economic structure of 
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the market is undergoing rapid change.  The percentage of wealth held in the form of intellectual 
property has been increasing at an exponential rate in developed state economies; the value of 
intellectual property rights often exceeds that of property per se in corporate asset portfolios, 
particularly in corporations making extensive use of biotechnological innovation.   Definitional 
line-drawing is at best a rough proxy for more compelling process-based questions concerning 
the manner in which intellectual property functions to generate value in a post-industrial 
economy. 
The similarity of the legal concepts of intellectual property and property per se is derived 
not from any shared methodology but instead from a shared objective;  both intellectual property 
and property per se provide holders of these rights with exclusionary value.  Exclusive rights of 
control generate market value by providing the holder with the ability to sell or license these 
rights or any portion thereof for commercial gain.  The exclusionary value of intellectual 
property, in accordance with its predominant justificatory rationale of utilitarianism, is set to the 
level necessary to balance incentives to create while still promoting a robust public domain.  In 
contrast, the exclusionary value of property per se is determined by the market alone, subject to 
certain regulatory restrictions in the public interest.  Thus the default exclusionary value of 
property per se is full commercial exploitation, not the more limited scope of commercial 
exploitation deemed necessary to overcome the public goods problem of intellectual property.
The legal infrastructure of the market, however, reflects the presumption that rights to 
property per se continue to predominate market transactions.  This is not the case.  Given the 
increased economic significance of intangible assets, market actors now seek to obtain 
exclusionary value in relation to intellectual property rights in a manner that permits continuity 
in the distributive effects of market transactions that previously woul d have engaged the full 
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exclusion value of property per se.  Quite simply, market actors now seek to use the forms of 
intellectual property to perform the functions historically associated with property per se.  They 
are attempting to obtain full commercial exploitation which exceeds the exclusionary value 
normally associated with term-limited monopoly rights intended solely to address public goods 
problems.   
The exclusion value considered necessary in order for property per se to perform its 
function as a background legal entitlement in a market economy is not in issue in this analysis, 
even though current patterns of distribution in many market economies leave much to be desired.  
Instead, the site of the controversy is that the market function of property per se is increasingly 
performed by intellectual property.  While historically ad hoc in their development, the 
predominant justificatory rationale for intellectual property rights, particularly patent rights, is 
utilitarian.  Intellectual property rights are ostensibly limited in function to addressing market 
failure in relation to public goods.  They are not designed as a matter of either law or policy to 
function as the background legal entitlement, in conjunction with contract, upon which the 
operation of the market depends.  
As with other periods in which significant transitions have taken place in the form in 
which wealth is held in market economies, legal rules adapt to deal with changing circumstances.
27
  By defining the relationship, however, between legal reasoning and legal classification on the 
basis of a single site of normativity, participants in the propertization debate may be providing 
the right answers to the wrong questions.  The objective of this analysis is to suggest a temporal 
27 See, for example, Morton Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Harvard University 
Press 1977).
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perspective as way of moving beyond this definitional impasse by exploring the meaning of 
intellectual property as a legal class in other than purely spatial terms.
4 A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF ‘PROPERTIZATION’:  CONCURRENT LEGAL 
CONCEPTS
When adopting a spatial analysis, intellectual property is differentiated from property per se on 
the basis of decision rules derived from justificatory rationales.  In these circumstances, the 
legitimacy of the claim of propertization is a matter of consistency between spatial classifications 
and their application to factual circumstances.  Definitionally, intellectual property is that which 
property per se is not, and when the spatial classification of intellectual property is applied to 
provide rights of exclusion in a manner more commonly associated with the characteristics of 
property per se, differences and thus presumptively legitimate defining characteristics are erased.   
As difference between legal concepts decreases, concurrency between legal classes increases, as 
does the resulting uncertainty in the law.   
Assuming without deciding, however, that this is indeed the case when legal classes are 
viewed in two- or three-dimensional form, the same is not necessarily the case when analysis 
includes a temporal dimension.  Difference is as much a matter of relativity as it is consistency, 
and relativity is concept of time, not space.  Thus we cannot evaluate claims of propertization (or
the implications for legal certainty) solely in spatial terms.    Instead, the legal classes of
intellectual property and property per se must be examined relative to each other as they operate 
in context, particularly in the context of the political economy of the market.  This requires a 
temporal approach to legal classification.  
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The legal concept of intellectual property is always in flux as it mediates between legal 
forms and market functions.  Thus from a temporal perspective, the claim of propertization as 
blurring the line between the legal classes of intellectual property and property per se reveals 
nothing of the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the process whereby the form of intellectual 
property, although designed to correct minor market failures in public goods, takes on the 
function of property per se in providing the background legal entitlements necessary for the 
political economy of the market to operate.   
A spatial perspective of intellectual property focuses on deviation from the classification 
criteria derived from one or more justificatory rationales.  A temporal perspective does not focus 
on deviation, as this is not a particularly helpful concept when dealing with legal classes 
perpetually in flux.  From a temporal perspective, one simply observes any exchange of 
conceptual characteristics which may take place during market-based encounters between the 
form of intellectual property and the functions of property per se.  The legitimacy of this 
exchange of conceptual characteristics based on functional necessity cannot be evaluated with 
reference to justificatory rationales used to classify intellectual property in spatial terms; 
encounter and exchange are processes that exist temporally, not spatially, and must be analyzed 
as actions rather than results. 28
Just as the rights and duties associated with the content-based legal classification of 
property per se represent a dynamic response to changes in the nature of the underlying assets, 
so do the rights and duties associated with the legal classification of intellectual property.   
28 See Laplantine and Nouse, above n 19 at 84.
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Typically, however, changes to the definition of intellectual property are attributed to the 
reiterative process of comparison between the justificatory rationales of intellectual property 
and its legal classification.  Thus the classification of intellectual property cannot transcend 
beyond a three-dimensional spatial perspective.  We return to Waddams’ critique of 
classification that legal meaning cannot exist if multiple legal concepts simultaneously inhabit 
the same legal class. 
Recall, however, that this critique of classification does not take into account a temporal  
analysis.   In terms of temporal process, intellectual property still performs its initial function as a 
legislative response to market failure, but has now assumed an additional function, typically 
associated with property per se, which is to provide the most significant form of background 
entitlements upon which the political economy of the market depends.  As a site of normativity, 
the political economy of the market would appear to assess the legitimacy of intellectual property 
in context on the basis of whether intellectual property adequately performs the function 
previously carried out by property per se, given that the normative legitimacy of the function 
itself has already been established.  
In contrast, any analysis predicated upon spatial forms of mutually-exclusive legal classes
will focus the ontological debate concerning propertization on consistency within a particular 
taxonomy.  Focusing on spatial analysis to the exclusion of a temporal perspective risks ignoring 
the dynamic process whereby intellectual property and property per se are continually 
reconfigured within a larger process of reconfiguration between market norms and justificatory 
rationales.  Consider the typical process of legal reasoning which adopts a spatial explanation of 
changes in modalities of resource allocation such as patent law in response to changing market 
conditions.  The reiterative nature of the relationship between market functions and justificatory 
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rationales for private rights of exclusion is at best implicitly acknowledged.  Legal reasoning 
proceeds, as set out in the following diagram, on the mistaken assumption that while the market 
may initiate change, justificatory rationales are the only relevant site of normativity for the 
development of a legal taxonomy.
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The necessarily arbitrary point of origin in the above diagram is technological change. 
For example, biotechnological innovation generates new assets of value or new methods of using 
existing assets, thus leading to market transactions involving these new assets or new uses of 
existing assets.  Given that the novel characteristics of these new assets or methods have not 
been anticipated within the legal regime governing commercial exploitation in this area, legal 
uncertainty exists in terms of who has rights to the potential revenue streams.29  This leads to 
competing claims framed within the language and discourse of a particular modality of resource 
allocation such as patent law, although the rationale for designating patent protection as the 
appropriate modality is more likely that of path dependency than any ex ante consideration of 
modalities of protection, including those outside the scope of traditional intellectual property 
law.30
In resolving these competing claims, courts and legislators ostensibly refer to justificatory 
rationales on the basis that modalities of resource allocation have been defined with reference to 
these rationales.  For patent law, this means that courts will refer to both the public goods 
problem of intangible inventions as well as the bargain theory for those inventions which are not 
susceptible to reverse-engineering.  A successful claim for increased protection accords 
exclusion value to the previously contested asset.  Generally, this results in a corresponding 
29 One particularly compelling example is that of the patenting of higher life forms.  The TRIPS Agreement allows 
Members to exclude higher life forms from patentability.  Despite the fact that such patents are granted in 
Members with the most significant investment in this form of biotechnology, Canada does not yet allow for the
patenting of higher life forms.
30 Note that the competing claims to rights to the exclusionary value within a modality of resource allocation may 
also include claims that exclusionary value should not exist as opposed to whom exclusionary value should be
allocated.  For example, the patenting of certain biotechnological innovations such as transgenic animals is a 
highly controversial practice, and many constituencies not generally associated with patenting concerns raise 
both deontological and consequentialist arguments in opposition.  In addition, competitors faced with an 
infringement suit will often argue against the patentability of the allegedly infringed invention.
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decrease in access value, although the decrease is rarely quantified. Positive spillover effects 
must also be taken into account.  In contrast, an unsuccessful claim will tend to lead to an 
increase in access value with a concomitant decrease in exclusion value.  As indicated in the 
diagram, exclusion value provides an incentive to invest in productive capacity for the purposes 
of biotechnological innovation, which in turn leads to further technological change, thus 
continuing the cycle in perpetuity.31
Note that in this spatial account, lack of consistency between justificatory rationales and 
the scope of protection is not necessarily the result of an intentional decision to depart from these 
justificatory rationales.  To allege that members of the judiciary are disingenuous in their 
ostensible adherence to justificatory rationales calls into question the repute of the legal process.  
Certainly a great deal of scholarship exists which both explains and justifies legal reasoning as 
subject to external pressures and biases, in particular legal realism and critical legal studies.  At 
the risk of sounding naïve, an alternative explanation is that normative acceptance of the 
presence of attributes of the legal concept of property per se within the legal classification of 
intellectual property has occurred prior to any reference in the legal reasoning process to one or 
more justificatory rationales.  Given that the temporal perspective of legal classification remains 
31 Note, however, that an increase in exclusion value is not the only relevant incentive for investing in productive 
capacity.  For example, an increase in access value can lower the costs of certain factors of production thus 
increasing productive capacity, that is to say that all innovation depends to a greater or lesser degree on access 
to existing knowledge.  Thus one of the most significant preoccupations of any justificatory rationale is the 
appropriate balance between exclusion and access.  Operating outside of the traditional framework of market 
failure, one can also argue that an increase in access value does not result in a disincentive to engage in 
productive capacity, but instead an incentive to engage in cooperative productive capacity.  Open source 
software distributed through general public license systems is an example of the degree to which an increase in 
cooperation value can stimulate innovation.  Note as well that even in cases where market failure cannot be 
addressed through the provision of incentives, a decrease in exclusion value could still be countered with a 
corresponding increase in subsidy value, i.e., public subsidies to accommodate levels of risk in innovative 
activities which exceed the capacity of the private sector to manage.
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unacknowledged, however, judicial reasoning must make reference to justificatory rationales as a 
recognized site of normativity if cognitive dissonance is not to result.  
Thus inconsistency is derived not from intentional transgression but implicit acceptance 
of an unacknowledged site of norm creation apart from justificatory rationales.  In other words, 
courts accept the normativity of expansion, but mistakenly attribute the source of this 
normativity to accepted justificatory rationales.  What this diagram does not (and cannot) 
illustrate is that when the political economy of the market undergoes rapid change, a spatial 
expression of the legal form of intellectual property as dictated by its classification is not 
necessarily consistent with its temporal function.   Thus one of the most relevant aspects of a 
temporal perspective is the ability to identify sites of normativity which do not originate with 
justificatory rationales, and which can be identified only be examining the temporal process of 
classification as opposed to its spatial product. 
Recall that the institutional design of intellectual property law is directed towards 
addressing limited instances of market failure; such a design is not intended to support the very 
function of the market itself.  Thus the relevant issue for determination from a temporal 
perspective is not whether consistency exists between justificatory rationales and the spatial form 
of intellectual property as a legal classification, but the legitimacy of a given market function 
when the function typically performed by property per se is now performed by the legal 
classification of intellectual property as it exists in flux.  The market is still predicated upon 
exclusionary value, but the changing political economy of the market has resulted in a greater 
percentage of wealth held in the form of exclusionary value in relation to intangible rather than 
tangible assets.  This has led to an exchange of attributes as the form of intellectual property 
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encounters the function performed by property per se within the context of this changing 
political economy. 32
Thus the legitimacy of a claim of propertization cannot be assessed from a spatial 
perspective alone.  Exclusive rights are indeed granted in accordance with one or more 
justificatory rationales, but these justificatory rationales are a response to and thus contingent 
upon market demands.  For example, the market demands that the exclusionary value of the 
background legal entitlements necessary for the market to function not be decreased simply 
because the nature of the underlying asset has changed from tangible to intangible form.  The 
result would be an unintentional distribution of wealth which would not receive normative 
acceptance unless the existing distribution of wealth was found to be normatively deficient and 
in need of reallocation.  
As illustrated in the following diagram, mutual redefinition between market demands and 
justificatory rationales is expressed in the legal system through intellectual property and property 
per se as modalities of resource allocation.  Concurrent with this process of mutual redefinition 
between market demands and justificatory rationales is a second process of mutual awareness 
and redefinition taking place between intellectual property and property per se.   The political 
economy of the market depends upon the allocation of private rights of exclusion, which in turn 
require a justificatory rationale, but the justificatory rationales used to assess the legitimacy of 
market-based transactions in intellectual assets do not exist independently of the political 
economy of the market itself.  
32 Values and attributes can also move from intellectual property to property per se. The implications for property 
per se will be addressed in a subsequent article.
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Intellectual property operates in the political economy of the market as a form of resource 
allocation in contact with other forms of resource allocation such as property per se.  Spatially, 
intellectual property possesses a form, but temporally, it performs a function.  While intellectual 
property exhibits a given spatial form as a matter of two- or three-dimensional legal 
classification, it might be performing quite a different temporal function in a fourth dimension in 
response to market demands.  It is within this disconnect between spatial form and temporal 
function that one can identify a process of norm creation that does not originate with typical 
justificatory rationales.   
In recognizing that temporal contact and exchange between intellectual property and 
property per se is not conditioned by preconceptions of the mutually-exclusive nature of legal 
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classifications in spatial form, we are able to acknowledge that contextual processes other than 
justificatory rationales create norms concerning the purposes and functions of intellectual 
property, and that these norms are relevant when considering changes to intellectual property law 
and policy.   What might appear to be a product of contradictory spatial classification may, when 
considered in context, be a temporal process of normative acceptance as the form of intellectual 
property is called upon to perform the function of property per se.
Perhaps the most important thing to note is that the concurrency of legal concepts in a 
single class in these circumstances takes place not in terms of form but of function.  When 
viewed from the vantage point of a temporal perspective, intellectual property is not simply a 
legal classification in spatial form.  Intellectual property also exists as a process of classification 
in flux.  A strict demarcation between intellectual property and property per se exists only at that 
necessary stopping point when legal reasoning demands that the legal class of intellectual 
property stabilise in spatial form.  Even in this spatial form, however, the legal meaning of the 
class at any given point in time is derived not only with reference to justificatory rationales, but 
also from the process of encounter and exchange between property per se and intellectual 
property in the context of market transactions involving biotechnological innovation.  Observing 
this process of encounter and exchange, one can identify that which is said to be 
epistemologically impossible, which is the co-existence of two legal concepts within a single 
legal class that nonetheless retains an organizational structure capable of providing meaning in 
law.
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5 REFRAMING THE ‘PROPERTIZATION’ DEBATE
The advantage of a temporal analysis as a way of knowing law is that it provides an opportunity 
to understand legal concepts such as intellectual property as constitutive processes involving 
multiple sites of normativity located in both space and time.  Understood spatially, the legal 
classification of intellectual property is a product of the justificatory rationales used to determine 
the appropriate allocation of intangible assets.  Intellectual property, however, can also be 
understood as a process of resource allocation increasingly called upon to perform the same
function as property per se as the proportion of wealth held in the form of intangible assets 
begins to dominate market transactions.  
The result is two-fold.  First, in terms of the propertization debate, it would appear that 
participants from both sides of the property rights/mere negative rights divide advance valid 
claims.  The process of exchange whereby the form of intellectual property performs the 
functions of property per se can receive normative acceptance on the basis of the legitimacy of 
the market function itself.  The result is a degree of concurrency between the legal concepts of 
intellectual property and property per se within one legal class, that of intellectual property.  
Concurrency itself is not an issue, given that concurrency of legal concepts, as Waddams argues, 
is the process by which legal reasoning often proceeds.  The difficulty is that acceptance on these 
terms is implicit; no attempt is made to reconcile the characteristics of intellectual property 
operating in this particular context and the definition of intellectual property as a legal class.  
That is to say, no attempt is made to reconcile these two sites of normativity in terms of any 
potential conflicts which might arise when considering currency from a purely spatial 
perspective.  
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The second result is surprisingly ignored by those who argue against propertization on 
the basis of consistency of the legal class of intellectual property with one or more justificatory 
rationales.  Emphasis on normative claims against propertization based on the spatial 
characterization of intellectual property as mere negative rights tends to obscure proprietary 
characteristics which have distributive effects other than those typically engaged by the 
incentives-access or bargain-disclosure paradigms of intellectual property law.  Neither 
adversaries of propertization nor courts consider the full range of ethical implications which arise 
when the legal class of intellectual property is influenced by the concurrent operation of the legal 
concepts of intellectual property and property per se as applied to protect the economic value of 
biotechnological innovations. 
I. IMPLICIT NORMATIVE TRANSFER IN JUDICIAL REASONING:  MONSANTO V. SCHMEISER
The significant change brought about by the transition in wealth from tangible to intangible 
assets arguably calls into question the justificatory rationales of intellectual property laws.  These 
laws have developed in an ad hoc and historically contingent manner,33 but pursuant to the now 
predominant justificatory rationale of utilitarianism, they are designed to address market failure 
in public goods.  This limited ambition must be contrasted with the much broader purpose of 
property per se, which is to provide the system of resource allocation upon which an entire 
market, and not merely isolated market failures, can be based.  If market actors and courts accept 
certain market functions as legitimate, such as the ability to generate maximum return on 
investment through the commercial exploitation of one’s assets, and accept as well, even 
33 For a detailed historical account of intellectual property law, see Brad Sherman & Simon Bently, The Making of 
Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience, 1760-1911 (Cambridge 1999).
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implicitly, that intangible assets now represent the majority of wealth held for commercial 
exploitation, an implicit normative transfer may occur.  
In certain factual circumstances, such as transactions performed by corporations which 
have no assets other than exclusive rights in intangibles, the fact that intellectual property carries 
out proprietary market functions rather than addresses market failures is perceived as legitimate 
so long as the functions themselves are accepted as legitimate.  Normative acceptance occurs not 
in spatial terms, that is to say by reference to one or more justificatory rationales used to 
determine the content of particular classes, but temporally as an exchange of values concerning 
the legitimacy of a given function, whatever might be its modality of expression.  Because the 
exchange of values resulting from this encounter is implicit rather than expressly acknowledged, 
no attempt is made to determine if such functions remain legitimate when carried out by 
intellectual property rather than property per se.  In particular, no attempt is made to reconcile 
these new functions with the spatial form of intellectual property as defined by one or more 
justificatory rationales.  Thus any potential conflicts between these two sites of normativity will 
be neither identified nor addressed.
We can see an example of this temporal process of implicit normative transfer in the 
reasoning of the majority in the recent Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Monsanto Canada 
Inc. v. Schmeiser.34 Monsanto held a patent which claimed, inter alia, a chimeric gene,35 a 
method for inserting the chimeric gene into a plant’s DNA, the plant cell in which the chimeric 
34 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser,  [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902.
35 A chimeric gene is one which does not exist in a natural state but is instead altered by combining the genetic 
material of two or more different species.
33
gene had been inserted, and a method for regenerating a glyphosate-resistant plant from the 
genetically modified cell. 36  As the founder plant propagates, all of the cells in its progeny will 
contain the patented chimeric gene, but the patent claims did not extend to the whole plant or 
seeds produced by the plant.    Such a claim would have been inconsistent with Canadian patent 
law which does not include plants and other higher life forms within the scope of patentable 
inventions.
Monsanto sells the seeds of genetically altered canola through distributors under the trade 
name of Roundup Ready Canola.  The distributors then resell the seeds to farmers pursuant to the 
terms of a Technology Use Agreement in which the farmers agree: (a) to purchase Roundup 
Ready Canola from authorized seed agents; (b) to use only Roundup herbicide, which is 
manufactured by Monsanto; (c) to sell the crop only to a commercial purchaser authorized by 
Monsanto; (d) not to sell or give the seed to any third party; and (e) not to save the seed from the 
crop for replanting.  As with many biotechnological innovations protected by patent rights, the 
necessity of placing such restrictions on use is due to the self-replicating nature of the invention. 
Typically, the doctrine of exhaustion would permit farmers to save and reuse the seed purchased 
from the distributor.  The first sale of the invention would have exhausted Monsanto’s 
intellectual property rights in the invention, leaving the farmer free to use and resell (but not to 
make) the invention.  Applied in these circumstances, however, the doctrine of exhaustion would 
transfer not only the single instance of the invention to the farmer, but also the means of 
production, both of which are embodied in the seeds.
36 The genetic modification increases a crop plant’s resistance to herbicides containing glyphosate, a chemical 
compound which inhibits an enzyme necessary for a plant’s survival.  Only unwanted vegetation will be killed 
off following spraying with herbicide; the genetically altered crop plant will survive.  
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Mr. Schmeiser operated a commercial farming operation, and had identified a small 
number of canola plants grown from Roundup Ready Canola seeds on his land.  Mr. Schmeiser 
harvested these plants, collected their seeds, replanted them and eventually produced over 1,000 
acres of Roundup Ready Canola plants.  Mr. Schmeiser, however, was not a party to a 
Technology Use Agreement with any distributor, and Monsanto brought an action against Mr. 
Schmeiser for patent infringement.  
Pursuant to s. 42 of the Canada Patent Act, the inventor has “the exclusive right, privilege 
and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used”.37
At issue was whether Mr. Schmeiser had ‘used’ the patented invention by harvesting Roundup 
Ready Canola plants found on his land, replanting these seeds and then selling the Roundup 
Ready Canola grown from these seeds.  Mr. Schmeiser argued that deciding the case in favour of 
Monsanto would in effect grant Monsanto patent protection not just for the chimeric gene and 
cells comprising the gene as claimed in its patent, but also over the whole plant.  This result 
would be inconsistent with the Court’s prior holding in Harvard College that plants and higher 
life forms are not patentable.  
The majority found in favour of Monsanto, basing its decision primarily on principles of 
statutory construction which require, inter alia, that “the inquiry into the meaning of ‘use’…must 
be grounded in an understanding of the reasons for which patent protection is granted”.38  The 
37 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 42.
38 See Monsanto, above n 34 at para. 90.
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majority did make reference, however brief, to the standard utilitarian justification for patent 
protection:
Huge investments of energy and money have been poured into the quest for better seeds 
and better plants.  One way in which that investment is protected is through the Patent 
Act giving investors a monopoly when they create a novel and useful invention in the 
realm of plant science, such as genetically modified genes and cells.39
The majority’s interpretation of ‘use’, however, bears little or no relationship with this 
utilitarian justificatory rationale.  This is demonstrated at the very least by the fact that the 
majority’s interpretation radically transformed the established test for determining an infringing 
use.40  Traditionally, consideration of infringing use in patent law is a relatively uncomplicated 
matter.  A court must simply decide whether an ostensibly infringing use falls within the scope 
of the claims.41  The emphasis is on the textual interpretation of the claims, given the 
significance of interpretation in defining the scope of the claims.   
The majority, however, held that the purpose of the statutory monopoly granted by the 
Act is to protect the patentee’s “business interests”.  Accordingly, ‘use’ is defined as any activity 
by the defendant which furthers its own commercial interests, given that, “[i]f there is a 
commercial benefit to be derived from the invention, it belongs to the patent holder”.  Thus what 
had been a relatively straightforward comparative analysis of equivalency, literal or substantive, 
between the impugned activity and the scope of the patentee’s claims, now includes a more 
39 Ibid. at para. 32.
40 Richard Gold, “Monsanto’s gain is everyone else’s pain”, Comment, The Globe & Mail (24 May 2004) A17.
41 Courts in Canada use a doctrine known as “purposive construction” to interpret patent claims.  The doctrine 
assumes that the patent is addressed to a “worker skilled in the art”, a technique which protects the patentee 
from excessive literalism and the public from overly-broad claims interpretation.  See Free World Trust v. 
Électro-Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024; Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067.
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abstract inquiry into the inherent nature of the impugned activity itself.  At issue now is whether 
the activity results in a commercial benefit which can be causally connected to the use of the 
invention.
The majority’s definition of ‘use’ in s. 42 of the Act demonstrates that its normative 
acceptance of Monsanto’s claims derives not from its reference to the necessity of a statutory 
monopoly to protect private investment in public goods, but in the functions that patents are 
expected to perform in the changed political economy of the market.   The asset portfolios held 
by corporations such as Monsanto consist almost entirely of the exclusive rights of use granted in 
the form of patent rights. Thus corporations such as Monsanto represent the type of market actors 
who seek to use the form of intellectual property to perform the function typically carried out by 
property per se, which is to fully exploit the commercial potential of corporate assets.  Full 
commercial exploitation requires exclusive rights over the whole of the asset at the discretion of 
the corporation, and not simply over particular uses which are determined by the state to be an 
appropriate balance of public and private interests in the creation and dissemination of new 
technology.
Note the significance of the fact that normative acceptance need not be explicit.  As noted 
by Gold, patentees, while framing their claims with reference to accepted justificatory rationales, 
are actually arguing for control over the entire commercial potential of intangible assets.  These 
claims exceed the utilitarian rationale of patent rights as a mere statutory corrective designed to 
grant control over that portion of the commercial potential necessary to address the market 
failure associated with the public goods nature of intangible assets:  
The argument for greater patent protection should be understood for what is: an attempt 
to maximize profit, not to maximize levels of innovation.  Clearly, a company would 
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prefer to have as large a monopoly as possible…But patent law is not about individual 
profit maximization; it is about maximizing the overall level of innovation in society.  
The two do not necessarily go together.42
For corporations such as Monsanto, the legal distinction between intangible and tangible 
assets has few if any normative implications.  To these companies, assets are property and 
property is to be commercially exploited to the fullest extent possible.  In Canada and the United 
States, corporate law itself demands that directors and officers place the economic welfare of the 
firm above any other countervailing interests.43  Notwithstanding the various possible 
interpretations of what it might mean to maximize the economic welfare of a firm, acting in the 
best interests of the firm tends to require profit maximization.44  Thus the relevance of Gold’s 
argument to this analysis is that while incentives may lead to innovation, innovation leads to 
profit and the profit motive itself is the primary concern of individual corporations, not the 
optimal level of innovative activity.
In the political economy of the market, the profit motive has normative acceptance and 
corporations should not be expected to engage in self-denial or to consider aggregate as opposed 
to individual welfare maximization when pursuing new claims for patent protection.  That is the 
role of legislators and courts when drafting and interpreting patent legislation.  Thus the demands 
42 E. Richard Gold, “Biomedical Patents and Ethics: A Canadian Solution” (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 413 at 423.
43 See for example, Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 122(1)(a) (“Every director and 
officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall act honestly and in good 
faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”).  See also Art. 322 C.C.Q. (“L’administrateur doit 
agir avec prudence et diligence.  Il doit aussi agir avec honnêteté et loyauté dans l’intérêt de la personne 
morale.”). For an interesting debate on whether acting in the best interests of the corporation should mean more 
than maximizing firm profits and thus shareholder wealth, see Ronald M. Green, “Shareholders as Stakeholders: 
Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance” (1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1409 and Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, “In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green” (1993) 
50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423.  
44 The term “profit maximization”, however, remains open to interpretation.  See e.g. Kraakman et al., The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford  2004) at 17-19.  
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of individual actors in the market, however valid within the political economy of the market 
itself, must be reconciled with one or more accepted justificatory rationales of patent protection.  
The difficulty is that courts appear to be implicitly responding to the normativity of the 
market in the form of the profit motive even as they refer expressly to traditional justificatory 
rationales in resolving disputes between the parties.  As stated succinctly by the majority in 
Monsanto, “[i]f there is a commercial benefit to be derived from the invention, it belongs to the 
patent holder”, and yet the same majority also reasoned that its decision was based on the 
utilitarian rationale of patent protection.  Reconciliation is not possible in circumstances where 
the presence of competing sites of normativity remains unacknowledged.  
II. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS:  HARVARD COLLEGE V. COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS (CANADA)
One of the most significant implications of an implicit normative transfer between the functions 
of property per se and the form of intellectual property is that the existence of proprietary 
attributes within the legal class of intellectual property in certain market contexts remains 
unacknowledged.  This obscures the extent to which intellectual property increasingly raises 
ethical considerations other than those derived from the incentives-access or bargain-disclosure 
paradigms.   The reasoning of both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) provide a timely example.45
Harvard College had applied for, and had been refused, a patent for a so-called 
oncomouse.  According to Harvard College, it had created a species of oncomouse when it 
genetically engineered certain mice to be susceptible to cancer in order to increase their utility as 
45 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents),  [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45.
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laboratory research animals.  At issue was whether higher life forms such as the genetically 
altered oncomouse were included within the scope of patentable subject matter pursuant to 
Canada’s Patent Act.  The Patent Examiner allowed the process claims for creating the genetic 
modifications, but did not allow a product claim over the genetically modified mouse itself.  
According to the Patent Examiner, this would amount granting a patent over a higher life form, 
and higher life forms are not within the statutory definition of patentable subject matter.  The 
Commissioner of Patents agreed and Harvard College subsequently sought judicial review.  
After proceeding through both the trial and appellate divisions of the Federal Court of 
Canada, the case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. Given that all the rights and 
obligations of patent law originate in the Patent Act, the case involved statutory interpretation of 
the definition of an ‘invention’ in terms of the scope of patentable subject matter.  By a narrow 
majority of 5-4, Bastarche J. in writing for the majority held that the statutory definition of 
patentable subject matter did not anticipate and thus did not include higher life forms.  Note that 
the majority did not decide that higher life forms cannot be patented, only that they did not 
amount to ‘inventions’ pursuant to the current legislation.  If higher life forms were to be subject 
to patent protection, Parliament would need to enact the necessary amendments.  Binnie J. in 
writing for the dissent would have found the definition of ‘invention’ sufficiently broad to 
include higher life forms. 
One point upon which both the majority and dissent agreed, and which is relevant for this 
analysis, is the appropriate characterization of patent protection as a mere negative right to 
exclude.  The Commissioner of Patents and several of the intervenors raised ethical objections to 
the patenting of higher life forms based on concerns for animal welfare and animal rights.  Both 
the majority and dissenting opinions agreed, however, that a patent does not provide the patentee 
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with an affirmative right of use.  Accordingly, patent law is ethically neutral. Ethical concerns 
arise not as part of the patenting process, but during upstream research and development and 
downstream commercialization of the patented processes and products.  Ethical issues are 
important and should be addressed, but through targeted legislation external to the patent regime 
rather than as a condition of patentability.46
Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions express any definitional uncertainty as to the 
nature of the rights granted and functions performed by intellectual property law.  Intellectual 
property grants mere negative rights; a patent grants only the right to exclude others from 
making, using or selling the claimed invention.  Such negative rights are not equivalent, in either 
form or function, to the affirmative rights granted by property per se.  Thus the ethical debates 
typically carried out by judges (particularly common law judges) in determining whether to 
extend property per se to include new assets is entirely absent from the reasoning. 47  As stated 
by Binnie J. in dissent: “This is not to say that patents are “neutral”, or have no link to the ethical 
46 Whether the patent system is the most appropriate regulatory site for governing associated ethical concerns is a 
matter of debate.  As Binnie J. notes in dissent, regional and international trade agreements such as NAFTA and 
TRIPS permit states to exclude from patentability inventions which, in their commercial exploitation, would be 
contrary to ordre public or morality.  Many jurisdictions do include an ordre public and morality clause in 
patent legislation, such as the European Patent Convention.  No such clause exists, however, in the Canadian 
Patent Act.  As noted by Bastarache J. for the majority, the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 
recommends that the significant ethical issues raised by the patenting of higher life forms be addressed by 
Parliament (although CBAC also recommends that patents be made available for higher life forms).  Parliament 
has yet to act, however, in response to the decision in Harvard College.
47 Compare the Court’s refusal to engage in ethical debate in Harvard College with the extensive debate 
concerning the ethics of granting a person property rights in cells excised from their body in Moore v. Regents 
of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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and social issues raised by the intervenors.  It is to say that those issues transcend the narrow 
question of patentability…”48
Thus Harvard College provides another illustrative example of the limitations of legal
classification conducted in purely spatial terms, whether two- or three-dimensional, to exclusion 
of a temporal analysis.  Those arguing against propertization would do well to expand their 
analysis of distributive effects beyond the typical public/private divide in terms of distribution of 
resources to consider non-economic implications as well.  In spatial terms, patent rights do 
appear to be mere negative rights, given that the objective of intellectual property legislation is to 
provide a time-limited monopoly sufficient to address market failure in public goods.  Patents are 
neither intended nor designed to provide inventors with full rights of commercial exploitation.  
In fact, as is evident from the decision in Harvard College, even as rights holders argue for what 
amounts to proprietary protection, they simultaneously rely on the characterization of patents as 
mere negative rights in arguing against the inclusion of ethical considerations as a criterion of 
patentability.  
Characterizing intellectual property rights as mere negative rights to exclude obscures the 
extent to which the exercise of these rights raises ethical concerns apart from achieving the 
appropriate balancing of private and public interests in accordance with the incentives-access 
paradigm.  Viewed from a temporal perspective, patents exist as a dynamic process of resource 
allocation in market transactions involving controversial assets created by biotechnological 
48 See Harvard, above n  45 at para 65.
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innovation.  In this context, patents perform functions and lead to distributive consequences 
which are similar to those associated with property per se.
6 CONCLUSION
We began this analysis with an inquiry as to whether legal classification can adequately 
represent legal knowledge.  In particular, disagreement exists as to whether the complexity of the 
relationship between legal reasoning and legal knowledge can ever be represented by a
taxonomy which exists in two-dimensional spatial form.  In other words, is cartography an 
adequate metaphor for explaining legal knowledge as the relationship between legal reasoning 
and legal classification?
One difficulty with phrasing the question in these terms, however, is tendency to confuse 
the explanatory metaphor with that which is to be explained.  Assuming that legal knowledge is 
too complex to be explained with reference to a metaphor of mapping does not call into quest ion 
the adequacy of the legal epistemology of classification, but merely the limitations of spatial 
representations of legal classifications.  The obstacle thought to preclude the use of classification 
as a way of knowing law is the complexity of legal reasoning.  Classification cannot place 
multiple legal concepts within a single legal class and still retain an organizational structure 
capable of providing meaning in law.
When viewed in temporal as opposed to purely spatial terms, however, concurrency of 
legal concepts within a legal class does not threaten the utility of legal classification as a way of 
understanding the nature and origins of legal knowledge.  A temporal perspective takes as its unit 
of analysis not the legal class itself in spatial form, but the process by which legal classes operate 
concurrently in a given context.  Using the current taxonomic debate over propertization of 
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intellectual property, the relevant context for the concurrent operation of the legal classes of 
intellectual property and property per se is that of the political economy of the market for 
biotechnological innovations.
When viewed from a temporal perspective, we can see that the propertization debate 
cannot be resolved by focusing on the definitional properties of the mutually-exclusive legal 
classes of intellectual property and property per se in spatial form.  Instead, attention should be 
directed to the manner in which the form of intellectual property is increasingly called upon to 
perform the functions of property per se in transactions involving biotechnological innovation.  
While intellectual property may appear to be a rotationally pure legal class as defined by one or 
more justificatory rationales, a strict demarcation between intellectual property and property per 
se exists only in spatial form.  When classification is presumed to exist only as the product of 
one or more justificatory rationales, mutually-exclusive classifications must necessarily result as 
a justificatory rationale cannot provide any sense of justification if it provides a classification by 
which intellectual property is simultaneously that which it is and that which it is not.
The reality, however, of concurrency of legal concepts within a single legal class as a 
process of legal reasoning can be addressed by adopting a temporal perspective.  From a 
temporal perspective, the focus is not on a legal class in spatial form, but on the encounter and 
exchange of values between the legal concepts of intellectual property and property per se as 
these classes operate in the context of the political economy of the market.  Given the increasing 
percentage of wealth represented by intangible as opposed to tangible assets, the spatial form of 
intellectual property is increasingly called upon to perform the temporal function of property per 
se, which is to provide the background legal entitlements upon which the operation of the market 
depends. Thus from a temporal perspective, we are able to take account of the concurrent 
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operation in context between legal classes, that of intellectual property and property per se.  The 
legal class of intellectual property, however, maintains its taxonomic integrity because 
concurrency exists in a temporal as opposed to spatial dimension.  
The most significant contribution of a temporal perspective is the insight that the legal 
class of intellectual property retains its taxonomic integrity because the meaning of the class in a 
temporal context is derived from a site of normativity other than a reference to one or more 
traditional justificatory rationales.  When we are no longer restricted to a spatial perspective of 
legal classification, we are able to acknowledge that contextual processes other than justificatory 
rationales create norms concerning the purposes and functions of intellectual property.  We can 
observe from a temporal perspective the contact and exchange of values between intellectual 
property and property per se.  What might appear in spatial form to be a contradiction in terms 
may, when considered in a temporal context, be viewed as a process of normative acceptance as 
the form of intellectual property is called upon to perform the function of property per se.
From the vantage point of a temporal perspective, we realize that the existence of the 
legal class of intellectual property is not limited to its spatial form, and thus the requirement of 
mutually-exclusive definitional properties within spatial classification is overcome.  Intellectual 
property also exists as a process of classification in flux, and a fixed line of demarcation between 
intellectual property and property per se comes into existence only at that point when legal 
reasoning demands that the legal class of intellectual property stabilise in spatial form.  Even in 
spatial form, however, the class of intellectual property derives meaning not only from reference 
to justificatory rationales, but also from the process of encounter and exchange between property 
per se and intellectual property in transactions involving biotechnological innovation.  The 
difficulty is that one can observe this process of encounter and exchange only from a temporal 
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perspective.  Thus we requires the addition of a fourth, temporal dimension to the analysis of 
legal classification in order to identify that which is said to be epistemologically impossible, 
which is the concurrent existence of two legal concepts within a single legal class which does not 
preclude the utility of legal classification as a way of understanding the nature and origins of 
legal knowledge.
